Learning Is Moving in New Ways: The Ecological Dynamics of Mathematics Education by Abrahamson, D & Sánchez-García, R
UC Berkeley
UC Berkeley Previously Published Works
Title
Learning Is Moving in New Ways: The Ecological Dynamics of 
Mathematics Education
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1xj3z1w8
Journal
Journal of the Learning Sciences, 25(2)
ISSN
1050-8406
Authors
Abrahamson, D
Sánchez-García, R
Publication Date
2016-04-02
DOI
10.1080/10508406.2016.1143370
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
JOURNAL OF THE LEARNING SCIENCES, 25: 203–239, 2016
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1050-8406 print / 1532-7809 online
DOI: 10.1080/10508406.2016.1143370
Learning Is Moving in New Ways:
The Ecological Dynamics of
Mathematics Education
Dor Abrahamson
Graduate School of Education
University of California, Berkeley
Raúl Sánchez-García
Sociology of Sport
Universidad Europea de Madrid
Whereas emerging technologies, such as touchscreen tablets, are bringing
sensorimotor interaction back into mathematics learning activities, existing educa-
tional theory is not geared to inform or analyze passages from action to concept. We
present case studies of tutor–student behaviors in an embodied-interaction learning
environment, the Mathematical Imagery Trainer. Drawing on ecological dynamic-
s—a blend of dynamical-systems theory and ecological psychology—we explain
and demonstrate that: (a) students develop sensorimotor schemes as solutions to
interaction problems; (b) each scheme is oriented on an attentional anchor—a real
or imagined object, area, or other aspect or behavior of the perceptual manifold
that emerges to facilitate motor-action coordination; and (c) when symbolic artifacts
are introduced into the arena, they may both mediate new affordances for students’
motor-action control and shift their discourse into explicit mathematical re-visu-
alization of the environment. Symbolic artifacts are ontological hybrids evolving
from things with which you act to things with which you think. Students engaged
in embodied-interaction learning activities are first attracted to symbolic artifacts
as prehensible environmental features optimizing their grip on the world, yet in the
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Color versions of one or more of the figures in the article can be found online at http://www.
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204 ABRAHAMSON AND SÁNCHEZ-GARCÍA
course of enacting the improved control routines, the artifacts become frames of ref-
erence for establishing and articulating quantitative systems known as mathematical
reasoning.
Mathematics, like music, needs to be expressed in physical actions and human
interactions before its symbols can evoke the silent patterns of mathematical
ideas.—Skemp (1983, p. 288)
Rules, like birds, must live before they can be stuffed.—Ryle (1945, p. 11)
INTRODUCTION: IN SEARCH OF AN ACTION-ORIENTED THEORY OF
MATHEMATICAL ONTOGENESIS
Background and Objective: Why Educational Theory and Practice Need
an Action-Oriented Theory of Mathematics Learning
With the increasing public availability of advanced technological platforms, we
are witnessing an efflorescence of commercial products designed for interactive
learning of mathematics content. In this brave new world, users manipulate virtual
objects to complete engaging tasks and, in so doing, per the vendors, develop con-
ceptual understanding of target notions, such as arithmetic operations. Although
these electronic devices are slow to enter mainstream education, they are literally
at the fingertips of any child who has access to a tablet; a smartphone; or any
other natural user interface platform, such as Wii, Xbox Kinect, or Leap Motion.
It is understandable that this unprecedented outburst in downloadable, over-the-
counter edutainment is slow to be evaluated, let alone guided by the educational
research community (Abrahamson, 2015). It is problematic, though, that extant
theory of learning is by and large a theory of learning with paper, informed neither
by the interaction possibilities of emerging technologies nor by what these possi-
bilities could imply for mathematical epistemology and pedagogy (Papert, 2004).
In the short term, the scarcity of bold research on interactive mathematics learn-
ing impedes the formulation of empirically based progressive policies concerning
the integration of technological environments into educational institutions. In the
long term, this scarcity is accelerating misalignment between theory of learning
and emerging practices to which it should apply. As children are learning to move
in new ways, theory of learning should move in new ways, too.
A motivation behind this article is that the pedagogical quality and institutional
acceptance of action-based learning environments largely depends on developing
informed scholarly and public discourse concerning what it means to learn a math-
ematical concept and what an instructor’s role might be in this process. Thus, we
are echoing Papert’s consistent call to leverage the technological revolution as
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ECOLOGICAL DYNAMICS 205
an opportunity for deep discussion of the potentially radical changes educational
systems should undergo (Papert, 1993, 1996). Similar to Papert, we are optimistic
that technological advances in educational media bear the potential of fostering
students’ deep understanding of mathematical concepts. Complementarily, these
technological advances bear the potential of fostering researchers’ deep under-
standing of learning processes. The objective of this article is to contribute first
steps toward developing a theory of action-based mathematics learning. We take
these first steps by arguing for what we believe to be productive directions for
investigating action-based learning, namely, adopting perspectives from scientific
disciplines dedicated to the study of motor action.
We begin by introducing the empirical context and findings that have motivated
us to seek, beyond seminal theories of mathematics learning, new approaches
oriented on cognitive, physiological, material, and social factors at play in
motor-action skills development.
Empirical Context: The Mathematical Imagery Trainer for Proportion
(MIT-P)
Our argument for the added value of action-based disciplinary perspectives is sit-
uated in emerging findings from qualitative analyses of empirical data gathered
in the context of implementing an experimental design for mathematics learn-
ing, the MIT-P. In this study, volunteering study participants manually operated
an unfamiliar technological system with the task objective of bringing this sys-
tem to a prescribed goal state, namely, moving their hands in space to make
a screen green (Abrahamson & Trninic, 2011; Howison, Trninic, Reinholz, &
Abrahamson, 2011). Figures 1 and 2 offer an overview of the design.
FIGURE 1 The Mathematical Imagery Trainer for Proportion set at a 1:2 ratio, so that the
favorable sensory stimulus (a green background) is activated only when the right hand is twice
as high along the monitor as the left hand. This figure sketches out our Grade 4–6 study partic-
ipants’ paradigmatic interaction sequence toward discovering an effective operatory scheme:
while exploring, the student (a) first positions the hands incorrectly (red feedback); (b) stumbles
on a correct position (green); (c) raises hands, maintaining a fixed interval between them (red);
and (d) corrects position (green). Compare (b) and (d) to note the different vertical intervals
between the virtual objects.
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206 ABRAHAMSON AND SÁNCHEZ-GARCÍA
FIGURE 2 Mathematical Imagery Trainer for Proportion display configuration schematics,
beginning with (a) a blank screen and then featuring a set of virtual objects overlaid incre-
mentally by the facilitator onto the display: (b) cursors, (c) a grid, and (d) numerals along the
y-axis of the grid. For the purposes of this figure, the schematics are not drawn to scale. Also,
the actual device enables the tutor to flexibly calibrate the grid, numerals, and target ratio in
between trials. The full protocol includes a range of ratios as well as a ratio table.
As they attempted to determine effective bimanual choreographies for manip-
ulating the system, and still before the grid was introduced, participants discerned
within the sensorimotor interaction field latent structures affording utilities for
better satisfying the task objective. In particular, the negative space between their
hands became foregrounded as a thing that they manipulated as a means of mak-
ing the screen green—the higher they raised the interval, the bigger they made
it. Moreover, when we then introduced into the interaction system certain sym-
bolic artifacts—a grid and then numerals (see Figure 2)—the participants adopted
these screen elements as frames of action and reference. In turn, using these arti-
facts shifted the participants’ manipulation strategies into forms of engagement
closer to mathematical visualization and reasoning. For example, for a 1:2 ratio
they raised their hands sequentially, with the left hand going up 1 unit and the
right hand going up 2 units (Abrahamson, Gutiérrez, Charoenying, Negrete, &
Bumbacher, 2012; Abrahamson, Lee, Negrete, & Gutiérrez, 2014; Abrahamson
& Trninic, 2015; Abrahamson, Trninic, Gutiérrez, Huth, & Lee, 2011).1
1Readers are referred to earlier publications for more detail on the design rationale that led to
the development of the MIT-P, including a critical reading of previous literature on the cognition of
multiplicative concepts (Abrahamson, 2015; Abrahamson et al., 2014; Reinholz, Trninic, Howison, &
Abrahamson, 2010). The didactical principle is to support classroom teachers in implementing their
own intuitions for proportionality. Teachers (and textbooks) often introduce the concept of propor-
tional equivalence by way of presenting a situated recipe notion. Per the recipe notion of proportional
equivalence, some sensory perception of a phenomenon, such as its color, is maintained amid supple-
menting substance into the situation. Thus, the idea of equivalence in 1:2 = 2:4 might be presented as
receiving the same color of green whether one mixes 1 cup of blue paint and 2 cups of yellow paint or
2 cups of blue paint and 4 cups of yellow paint. Whether we compare ratios of paint components (color
perception), geometrically similar rectangles (aspect ratio), or food ingredients (flavor), this notion of
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ECOLOGICAL DYNAMICS 207
We conceptualize the emergence of these embodied structures and interac-
tion strategies as pivotal to the guided cognitive process of first controlling the
device and then mathematizing this skill. Therefore, and putting aside the ques-
tion of what these students ultimately learned through these activities, we view
their documented behaviors as relevant and perhaps paradigmatic for a discussion
of action-based learning.2 Still, what theory of learning might best inform our
understanding of these behaviors?
Open Questions and General Arguments: A Rationale for Action-Based
Theories
In making sense of these data, we were inspired by seminal theories of cognitive
development. Per genetic epistemology (Piaget, 1968), spontaneous coordination
of sensorimotor activity around an interval between the hands can be viewed
as reflective abstraction of a correlational invariant—the higher, the bigger—
which then becomes encapsulated and generalized via discourse (Abrahamson
the equal sign as meaning equivalent sensory perception between two phenomena is pedagogically
sensible, because it paves conceptual continuity from earlier arithmetic notions of parity associated
with the equal sign—it makes the two different mathematical expressions the same (Abrahamson,
2002, 2012a). At the same time, our argument goes, teachers are technically challenged in creating
within their classrooms effective opportunities for their students to experience the perceptual equiva-
lence of situated proportionality, let alone to rigorously investigate, predict, enact, measure, calculate,
challenge, and reinvent proportionality. Thus, we view the pragmatic outcomes of this line of work
ultimately as contributing to forms of mathematical instruction that encourage students to inquire into
curricular content by engaging in carefully designed sensorimotor experiences (Abrahamson, 2012a;
Kalchman et al., 2000; Nemirovsky, 2003).
2We acknowledge that our focus, in this article, on the 1:2 ratio might appear as setting too low a
bar even for a proof-of-existence argument for the utility of our approach. After all, children demon-
strate particular sensitivity to visual displays of half by using this perceived symmetry as a benchmark
for inference making (Nunes & Bryant, 1996; Sophian, 1995; Spinillo & Bryant, 1991, 1999), and
these sensitivities may be related to primitive actions of equipartitioning (Confrey & Scarano, 1995).
We thus refer readers to our earlier publications in which we report results from using other ratios
beyond 1:2 (Abrahamson & Howison, 2010; Reinholz et al., 2010). Also, we wish to highlight that our
design explicitly took on students’ endemic confusion around additive versus multiplicative reason-
ing (Post, Cramer, Behr, Lesh, & Harel, 1993). We created interactions wherein sensorial constancy
(i.e., keeping something the same about a situation) could be achieved by changing the difference
between two quantities and figuring out how this change covaried with the quantities. Our learning
materials and activities (see Figures 1 and 2) were thus explicitly focused on creating opportunities for
students to experience cognitive conflict when they initially attempted to keep the difference constant
amid changes in the quantities; come to realize that their tacit theory of action had failed them; and
then reconcile this conflict by way of reflective abstraction to coordinate, encapsulate, generalize, and
progressively mathematize new rules. Thus, we build on a generation of constructivist design-based
research on mathematics learning. We offer that the efficacy of those designs might be attributed to the
tacit sensorimotor struggles and coordinations inherent in successfully enacting those tasks, and our
work might be viewed as making visible those invisible actions.
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208 ABRAHAMSON AND SÁNCHEZ-GARCÍA
& Sánchez-García, 2015; Abrahamson, Shayan, Bakker, & Van der Schaaf, in
press). Per cultural–historical psychology (Vygotsky, 1930/1978), we concep-
tualized the interval as a self-generated artifact. Wedged between the subject
and the object (Sfard, 2007), the interval served as an emergent auxiliary con-
struction mediating the students’ participation in the social enactment of a novel
cultural practice. The respective work of Saxe (2002) and Radford (2005) clari-
fied the transitional function of cultural forms in the MIT-P activity. In particular,
we realized that changing the task from enactment to representation changed
the function of the gridlines from handles anchoring visual attention to semi-
otic means of objectifying new meanings. According to distributed cognition
theory (Chandrasekharan & Nersessian, 2015; Schwartz & Martin, 2006; Zhang
& Patel, 2006), the students adjusted to the new external feature by offloading
aspects of their action scheme onto its structure so that the grid, an external
feature, became an integral component of situated action. We further used instru-
mental genesis (Verillon & Rabardel, 1995) to identify and articulate how the
students plied and applied the interval, once it was constructed, as a means of
accomplishing a situated task. Situated cognition (Greeno, 1994, 1998, 2015)
inspired us to consider this development of a new motor-action routine as the
emergence of new perceived affordances in the environment. A best fit was
found in assertions from the philosophy of enactivism (Varela, Thompson, &
Rosch, 1991), such as “(1) perception consists in perceptually guided action
and (2) cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that
enable action to be perceptually guided” (pp. 172–173). The cognitive struc-
ture interval and its sensorimotor pattern higher–bigger coemerged dialectically
from exploring the MIT-P. Enactivism, however, was not readily enabling us
to insert the teacher, a guiding cultural agent, into the picture of individual
learning.
The elegance and power of these theories notwithstanding, we thus sensed that
they were not optimally geared to explain some intriguing aspects of our empirical
data. In particular, the theories did not illuminate the (a) spontaneous microgene-
sis of imaginary objects mediating sensorimotor control of interactive systems (the
interval); (b) adoption of symbolic artifacts as regulatory enactive, epistemic, and
discursive devices (the grid); and (c) educators’ active role in facilitating effec-
tive sensorimotor engagement. And yet these three observed phenomena could be
typical of learning processes in action-based design and therefore important for
building a theory of action-based learning. We were thus inspired to consider a
theory coming from a discipline focused specifically on individuals’ guided devel-
opment of situated motor-action skills. Namely, we were favorably inclined to
adopt from sports sciences the theory of ecological dynamics. This article spells
out how ecological dynamics could illuminate these three phenomena.
We hasten to note up front that our focus in this article on fostering motor-
action skill should not for a moment suggest that we are disregarding or mitigating
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ECOLOGICAL DYNAMICS 209
the formative role of symbols in the development of mathematical knowledge or
disavowing the rich theoretical and practical challenges that the symbolic register
introduces (Duval, 2006; Kirsh, 2010a; Lesh, Post, & Behr, 1987; Radford,
2013). Rather, we believe that there has not been sufficient focus in the literature
on the initial development of action schemes via direct or vicarious interaction
with instructional media (but see de Freitas & Sinclair, 2012; Kim, Roth, &
Thom, 2011). At the same time, we view embodied-interaction technologies
as powerful yet underresearched means of fostering those action schemes
(Abrahamson, 2012b). Accordingly, this article treats the initial construction of
operatory schemes more so than the subsequent signification of these schemes
in semiotic systems of the mathematics discipline. Per the embodied-design
framework (Abrahamson, 2009, 2014, 2015), we thus discuss Step 1 more than
Step 2.
The next section introduces the theory of ecological dynamics as it relates
to our research. The section called “The Ecological Dynamics of the MIT:
Paradigmatic Examples From Implementing an Action-Based, Concept-Oriented
Learning Activity” presents paradigmatic vignettes from the MIT project so as to
address the three problematic phenomena (see above) from an ecological dynam-
ics view. The final section offers concluding comments on the scope of our
approach vis-à-vis the manifold of mathematics pedagogy.
ECOLOGICAL DYNAMICS
What Is Ecological Dynamics?
Ecological dynamics (Vilar, Araújo, Davids, & Renshaw, 2012) is a theoretical
approach used in sports sciences to study skill acquisition in natural settings or
naturally occurring activities. This framework blends dynamical systems theory
(Edelman, 1987; Thelen & Smith, 1994) and Gibson’s (1977) ecological psy-
chology. Applying dynamical systems to ecological psychology enables sports
scientists to explain the learning of physical skills as the complex self-organizing
of subject–environment dynamical systems. Consider the case of an infant learn-
ing to walk. From a dynamical systems perspective, it is neither the case that she
gets input from her body, figures it all out in her brain, then carries this out with
the body nor that the infant must achieve biological maturation of the brain before
she can plan and execute the complicated motor-action coordination of motility.
Rather, walking happens. Thelen and Smith (1994) reported on elegant studies
demonstrating that walking is an emergent form of iterated motor actions initially
absent of central cerebral control. When infants much younger than normative
walking age are dressed in a harness and stood over a moving walkway, walking-
like actions manifest spontaneously, sequentially, each leg at its turn jerking
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210 ABRAHAMSON AND SÁNCHEZ-GARCÍA
forward to prevent an anticipated stumble. Then at some point one might discern
anticipatory agency in raising the knees so as to maintain greater stability. But
the body is at the vanguard of motor-action learning. The same principle has been
demonstrated in robotics—machines that were never programmed to walk never-
theless develop walking-like behaviors when placed in appropriate environments.
In the absence of any executive commanding unit, new and robust motor-action
routines self-organize via situated interaction in constrained settings. As Clark
(1999) wrote, “The active body of the robot is here providing the functional
equivalent of the missing second layer of neural processing” (p. 52).
Thus, in a dynamical systems approach, decision-making and learning pro-
cesses are modeled not as generating a sequence of disembodied symbolical
propositions, such as abstracted inferences and decisions, but as emerging from
the agent’s goal-oriented, situated, adaptive interactions in the environment
(Araújo, Davids, Chow, Passos, & Raab, 2009). Moreover, the emergent quality
of self-organizing complex adaptive systems implies that learning processes are
highly dependent on organismic qualities; for example, a shorter basketball player
might develop a different style of throwing the ball to the basket compared to
her taller teammate. Finally, the same bottom-up emergent quality of naturalistic
learning processes implies that they are not linear but stochastic. Thus, the order
of events along natural learning processes varies both within and across individu-
als. Yet whereas each inter- and intra-personal trial is sensitive to initial conditions
and susceptible to random encounters, individuals tend to gravitate toward simi-
lar systemic solutions that satisfy task objectives amid multiple constraints. For
example, athletes reared by the same coach, in the same space, under equivalent
regimes and diets, and with the same event goals will develop a comparable style
that nevertheless bears an idiosyncratic signature.
We are thus characterizing human learning as systemic, emergent, nonlin-
ear, distributed, and self-adaptive. In so doing, we are building on approaches
to human development inspired by nonlinear dynamics. Nonlinear dynamics is a
branch of physics that provides a formal representation of any system evolving
over time. The behavior of any living system can be plotted as a trajectory into
a state space (all possible states of the system and the paths to them). We can
identify different stably dynamical states of a system, known as attractors, equiv-
alent to functional states of coordination. For example, the human movement
system self-organizes via constant subject–environment interactions in recurrent
perception–action loops. One might consider the motor actions of a professional
laborer wielding a sledgehammer. No two strikes are ever identical, and greater
variation is manifest as goals and constraints vary, and yet all strikes are contex-
tually adapted instantiations of one and the same systemic attractor, an agent’s
dynamical solution to the situated problem of satisfying task objectives perceived
as similar (Bernstein, 1996).
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ECOLOGICAL DYNAMICS 211
Systemic conceptualizations of human–environment relations have yielded
powerful theoretical constructs, and some of these have found their way into
seminal discourses of the learning sciences. Perhaps the most familiar of these
constructs is that of an affordance imported from ecological psychology into
the learning sciences by way of the human–computer interaction design litera-
ture (Norman, 1998). In a subject–environment system, affordances, understood
as opportunities for action (Gibson, 1977), emerge within goal-directed activity.
The concept of affordances is pivotal to understanding decision making from
the perspective of ecological dynamics: Opportunities for goal-oriented action
emerge within the dynamics of the system that may produce shifts between func-
tional states of coordination. For example, when an athlete standing in the soccer
field apprehends an approaching ball, he may perceive affordances for goal-
oriented actions of kicking and thus shift into an appropriate functional state of
coordination.
Yet if the human movement system adaptively self-organizes via subject–
environment sensorimotor interaction, how should we conceptualize the role of
social intervention in the development of functional coordination? That is, how
does teaching work?
Coaching Ecological Dynamics: Constraints-Led Nonlinear Pedagogy
When a dynamical system consists of human agents engaged in goal-oriented
activity, its self-organizing behavior can be affected or “channeled” (Araújo &
Davids, 2004, p. 50) by different types of constraints. Imagine a hiker walk-
ing toward a distant destination along a path that varies in terrain from paved
road to sand, mud, slush, and snow. These changes in the path’s substance can
be regarded as constituting different environmental constraints on the execu-
tion of walking (compare the knee work for snow and asphalt). Our hiker may
well become fatigued by this trudge, thus introducing organismic constraints
on the journey. At this lower energy level, she slouches ahead. Now, in turn,
the many miles still ahead might demand of the hiker even faster walking so
as to arrive still before dusk in time to pitch a tent. Thus, the task constraint
changes.
Indeed, Newell (1986) identified three sources of constraints affecting the
behavior of the system on either a short time scale (decision making while per-
forming a skill) or a longer time scale (the process of learning a skill): organism,
environment, and task. Organismic constraints are present at the biochemical,
biomechanical, neurological, and morphological levels; environmental constraints
can be ambient/global to action (gravity, temperature) or local/focal to action
(availability of tools); and task constraints include the goals of the action as well
as any socially agreed rules (Newell, 1996, p. 404). Thus, contrary to classic cog-
nitivist models, the behavior of the system is not premeditated or controlled by
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212 ABRAHAMSON AND SÁNCHEZ-GARCÍA
internal directives or explicit rules. Within the ecological dynamics framework,
the human agent’s intentions concerning goals to be achieved are just one among
other constraints affecting systemic behavior.
From a pedagogical point of view, the introduction of appropriate constraints
into the system is an issue of paramount importance. Introducing constraints can
help learners become perceptually attuned to relevant affordances for performing
a specific skill. This is a common phenomenon in sport activities. According to
converging studies, “athletes’ perceptual sensitivity may indicate perceptual learn-
ing by attunement to the appropriate informational variables available as a result
of perceptual–motor experience in their sport” (Weast, Shockley, & Riley, 2011,
p. 704). For example, a high jumper becomes through practice increasingly sensi-
tive to select informational variables relevant to optimizing his running approach
so that he clear the bar. Still, though it is ultimately the athlete who performs the
jump, his technique was honed over the years of practice by a coach. In particu-
lar, the athlete’s perceptual–motor experience and attunements can be channeled
by pedagogical intervention. It is important to note that coaches do not teach
directly (linear pedagogy) but create conditions appropriate for the emergence
of the athlete’s learning (nonlinear pedagogy; see below).
Davids, Button, and Bennet (2008) and Renshaw, Chow, Davids, and
Hammond (2010) have proposed a nonlinear pedagogical approach to motor-
action learning based on introducing and modifying constraints in the learning
environment. The objective of nonlinear pedagogy is to optimize systemic oppor-
tunities for athletes to develop robust skills that are both task appropriate and
tailored to their organismic constraints. Key to the success of nonlinear pedagogy
is creating physical and cultural conditions that enable and encourage athletes
to engage in subjective exploration and self-discovery, wherein variability and
flexibility are regarded as positive outcomes (Vereijken & Whiting, 1990). This
pedagogy of diverse personalized solutions is in stark contrast with traditional
didactics, wherein athletes are directed to perform repeatedly predetermined
ideal technical solutions and wherein exploration and self-discovery are not
fostered.3
Consider a piano teacher who would like his student to strike the keys with
fingers extending flat rather than curved at the knuckles. He could explain this
technique and demonstrate it to her; then, once the student attempts to emulate
his action, he could manually correct her hand shape. Alternatively, the teacher
3Note that nonlinear pedagogy resonates strongly with the work of Soviet neurophysiologist and
founder of biomechanics Nikolai Bernstein (1896–1966): Whereas linear pedagogies emphasize repe-
tition of idealized motor actions and therefore view variability as noise or error distributed around the
ideal, Bernstein (1996) viewed motor learning as a form of problem solving and insisted that variabil-
ity in conditions fosters the development of dexterity, that is, flexibility to adapt motor performance to
diverse ad hoc contexts.
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ECOLOGICAL DYNAMICS 213
could place a book on the student’s hands as she is playing and ask that the book
never fall. The book constitutes a constraint on the student’s actions. It perturbs
the dynamic stability of the existing student–keyboard music-oriented dynamical
system. In response, the student must adapt her situated motor-action schemes
in tune with the modified task/environment. She accommodates her sensorimotor
relation with the keyboard by developing a new motor-action coordination of play-
ing the piano with straight hands. Thus, via the mediation of the book constraint,
the piano comes to afford a new way of acting on it. At this point, the book may
no longer be necessary and could thus be removed. The book played the role of an
enabling task constraint: Initially it was restrictive, and yet it shaped a new way
of relating to the piano. It is important to note that it is the student who solved
the problem, and presumably her solution was best adapted to her organismic
idiosyncrasies, such as the length and suppleness of her fingers. Moreover, the
teacher never told or showed the student how to solve the problem.
Readers familiar with constructivist pedagogical philosophy might note a sim-
ilarity between nonlinear, constraints-led pedagogy and the principle of fostering
opportunities for individuals to reinvent cultural–historical knowledge (Kamii &
DeClark, 1985). It is important that from an objective materialist perspective nei-
ther the piano itself nor the book itself changed in this process—only the student
changed, and this change could perhaps be documented through neuroimaging
techniques. However, from the ecological dynamics perspective what changed was
the student–piano relation (Roth, 2015)—a new affordance was created. From the
ecological dynamics systemic perspective it does not make sense to say that the
student per se has changed, because what the student learned is intrinsically situ-
ated and mutually adaptive (Malafouris, 2013; Schwartz & Martin, 2006). As far
as the student is concerned, the world has changed—it now bears new opportu-
nities for action (new meaning, Cisek, 1999; new horizons, Dreyfus & Dreyfus,
1999; new affordances, Gibson, 1950; a new enactive landscape, Kirsh, 2013).
Moreover, the new technique is necessarily situated whether the student is actu-
ally playing, miming playing, marking playing (Kirsh, 2010b), or just imagining
playing.
We value these phenomenological conceptualizations of learning because
they enable us both to practice and research what we view as student-centered
pedagogy. Moreover, these pedagogical views from the sports sciences enable
us to better position our work within the broader literature on cultural strategies
for fostering valued motor-action skill. As we now explain, the technologically
rich learning environments at the center of our design-based research efforts can
be viewed as spaces for enacting a form of ancient cultural practice—nonlinear,
constraints-led pedagogy for fostering individuals’ development of motor-action
routines. These spaces, as we will see, have been called fields of promoted action.
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214 ABRAHAMSON AND SÁNCHEZ-GARCÍA
Designing for Discovery: Fields of Promoted Action
An enduring concern for educators operating in nonlinear pedagogy is to
design and implement ecological conditions, tasks, and resources that facilitate
students’ self-exploratory activity, resulting in targeted skill outcomes. Cultural
anthropologists of motor-skill development call these ecological conditions fields
of promoted actions (Reed & Bril, 1996, p. 438). A field of promoted action is
a socially constructed and monitored microecology in which a novice, such as
an infant, is presented with a specific motor problem as well as constraints—
organismic, environmental, and task based—that encourage self-exploratory
behavior leading to the discovery and practice of culturally valued action solu-
tions. Fields of promoted action thus foster students’ agency and customization in
their own learning process: students are guided to reinvent viable ways of being
in the world, where these ways were never dictated, demonstrated, explained, or
cued.
By way of example, consider the sport of boxing. Hristovski, Davids, Passos,
and Araújo (2012) engaged boxing novices in a basic training session in which
boxing experts taught the novices a front-punch. As the novices practiced front-
punching a punching bag, the researchers discreetly calibrated the task constraints:
They moved the punching bag laterally within the boxing novices’ field of action.
Once the punching bag passed a critical point, where the front-punch apparently
became too awkward to execute, the novices responded by performing a back-fist
punch. They thus reinvented a cultural–historical maneuver that they had not used
prior to that session.
Figure 3 depicts and summarizes the notion of a constraint-based field of
promoted action. By way of illustration, let us return to the piano lesson example,
FIGURE 3 Nonlinear pedagogy: introducing constraints into a field of promoted action. The
inclusion of different constraints affects the recurrent perception–action loops of the organism–
environment dynamical system, bringing forth new affordances for performing a specific task-
oriented coordination pattern. Adapted from Newell (1996).
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ECOLOGICAL DYNAMICS 215
in which the instructor interpolated a book as an environmental constraint on the
student–piano relation. Therein, “Action” would refer to the goal-oriented phys-
ical motions (hand–arm–torso movements directed at striking the piano keys),
and “Information” would include multisensory perceptions (auditory input from
the key strikes; visual, haptic, and tactile sensations from the keys and book;
somatic, kinesthetic, and proprioceptive perceptions in the torso; and so on).
Disequilibrated by the new constraint, the system begins adapting so as to continue
generating task-oriented behavior: A modified Action–Information loop begins to
evolve as the student iteratively tunes her actions vis-à-vis the information they
elicit and keeping within all constraints. Thus, the environment, in particular the
piano, comes to afford a new coordination pattern, so that the system achieves
new dynamical stability.
We have now discussed fields of promoted action, and we have considered the
idea of a coach introducing productive constraints into a student’s task-oriented
perception–action loops. As educational researchers, we are aware of the manifold
forms that instruction can take. We now turn to look at some of these forms of
intervention from a systemic perspective. We will be talking specifically about
various forms of feedback that a coach/teacher might offer an athlete/student.
Implementing Nonlinear Pedagogy: Real-Time Augmented Information as
Productive Constraints Promoting Discovery
A model of learning as tuning action to accommodate constraints need not
imply that all the teacher does is set the proper field and then leave the student
to explore (cf. Kirschner, Sweller, & Clark, 2006). The didactic setting is far
more interactive. A paramount concept developed by Newell (1996) is that of
augmented information,4 a subcategory of environmental constraints. This sub-
category includes various forms of supplementary information, such as didactical
input coming from a coach or, via technological extension, from some feedback
mechanism. It is critical to note that learners engaged in self-exploratory activ-
ities do not always have access to this information. Newell (1996) stated that
“augmented information acts as an environmental constraint to action. The differ-
ent categories of information provide varying boundary conditions to the search
4Augmented information itself breaks down into three different types that are thus sub-
subcategories of environmental constraints: (a) Prescriptive information refers to the multimodal
specification of the target action; (b) information feedback is what the performer receives from his
or her own movement, whether during the action (concurrent) or as its result (terminal); and (c) tran-
sition information is any kind of external input that reacts to the agent’s performance of an action by
way of offering qualifying instructions toward the prospective reenactment of that action (e.g., “Turn
more energetically this time!”).
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216 ABRAHAMSON AND SÁNCHEZ-GARCÍA
through the perceptual-motor work space in the realization of new task goals”
(p. 424).
The notion that information coming from a coach constitutes a constraint may
present itself as somewhat odd. Yet recall that the word constraint in this context
does not bear its colloquial meaning as a negative factor. Per systemic views of
learning, the novice is searching for effective modes of behavior. Any relevant
information, whether from sensory perception or from a guiding cultural agent,
facilitates the search by negating the vast combinatorial branches of possible
action.
Augmented information comes in a variety of modalities, including speech
and/or gesture but also direct physical contact. Becvar Weddle and Hollan (2010)
described the variety of didactical strategies used by dental hygiene experts in
guiding novices into the practice. In so doing, they offered the phrases “molding”
and “directing” (p. 128). Molding is the didactical practice of literally manipu-
lating the learner’s body so as both to guide and constrain him or her through a
dynamical envelope of situated physical performance. Molding may appear to an
onlooker to be the most direct way possible of getting a learner to do the thing
itself correctly. However, from an ecological dynamics perspective molding is not
about prescribing rote physical actions. Rather, molding should optimize learners’
opportunities to experience and solve a motor coordination problem. As they are
taken through the motions, learners seek agency by engaging the environment,
attending to relevant information, grasping at features, sensing relevant informa-
tional invariants co-occurring with effective actions, adjusting their motor-action
coordinations to emulate the molded action patterns, and so building effective
perception–action loops. Thus, learners develop perceived affordances for accom-
plishing new tasks (see also Abrahamson et al., 2012; Churchill, 2016; Ginsburg,
2010; Ingold, 2000). Directing captures expert guidance communicated primar-
ily in the speech/gesture modalities. It is the most salient form of augmented
information in mainstream mathematics classroom instruction (Alibali & Nathan,
2012).
From the ecological dynamics perspective, all forms of intervention pose
constraints (augmented information) on students’ solution of motor-action prob-
lems. These forms include, but are not limited to, physical guidance, joint
enactment, and metaphoric framing (Abrahamson, Sánchez-García, & Smyth, in
press). Yet whereas it is the instructor who introduces augmented information,
students themselves are able to develop new structures that productively constrain
their own interactions. We now discuss these structures, attentional anchors.
Attentional Anchors
Systemic approaches to the analysis of mathematics teaching and learning fore-
ground the inherently relational nature of students’ situated cognitive activity.
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ECOLOGICAL DYNAMICS 217
It is these agent–environment relations, developed through goal-oriented activity
in dedicated task spaces, that give rise to students’ targeted conceptual knowledge.
These desirable relations emerge from having students discover and practice spe-
cific perception–action routines. From a system perspective, then, the pedagogical
enterprise is to educate students’ perception, so that “cognitive structures emerge
from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be perceptually
guided” (Varela et al., 1991, p. 173). Now, if this systemic framework is to have
traction on empirical data coming from educational research, what might we look
for as evidence that these cognitive structures exist and are indeed emerging? In
particular, what form of hypothetical construct might we implicate as evidence of
this learning process? This construct would need to be suitable for a discussion of
guided discovery-based learning within dedicated environments. We propose the
attentional anchor as this construct. The current section introduces the construct
and explains its role in our study.
Consider a cellist working on the quality of his sound production. He is playing
long bow strokes, listening carefully to nuances of sonority and attending medi-
tatively to the body’s intimate sensations. At one point he realizes that he can
feel in his bowing hand (the right hand) whether the left hand is holding down
the string loosely or firmly on the fingerboard, and he notices that, reciprocally,
he can feel in his left hand whether the right hand is holding the bow loosely or
firmly. He becomes attuned to the hands feeling each other as mediated through
the string and bow. The hand-to-hand instrumented bond becomes a collective unit
that vibrates more or less according to the firmness of grips. The cellist monitors
for the effect of this vibrating bond on the quality of sound, and he experiments
with the acoustic results of adjusting the bond via micro-operations of each hand.
The bond, which had been latent to the environment and outside the scope of tacit
consciousness, is now the new thing that the cellist manipulates as his means of
controlling the quality of sound. The bond is not the hands themselves—the hands
subtend the bond that lives and quivers between them; the bond is external to the
body, a current or buzz that the hands at once operate and feel. Of course the cel-
list’s attention may still wander back and forth between his individual hands and
the bimanual bond, but all sensorimotor activity is now subservient to and con-
ditional on controlling the bond. The bond is now a bona fide phenomenological
entity, an interactive ontological unit, a new gestalt tool for controlling the quality
of sound. The bimanual instrumented bond has become an attentional anchor that
the cellist appropriates into his musical toolbox. This attentional anchor acts as
a constraint on the infinite search for optimal sound production. Under this con-
straint, the cellist develops a new motor-action coordination. The cello thus comes
to afford a new way of playing, and following much practice the attentional anchor
might become second nature and fall below consciousness.
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218 ABRAHAMSON AND SÁNCHEZ-GARCÍA
An attentional anchor is a hypothetical construct first articulated by Hutto
and Sánchez-García (2015). Their paper applied philosophical tenets of radical-
enactivist cognition to the explication of empirical phenomena researched by
sports scientists. In turn, the construct of attentional anchor is central to our thesis
on the sociocultural ontogenesis of mathematical concepts. What is more, if our
claims bear merit, then attentional anchors could be considered in designing and
researching educational activity quite broadly for any disciplinary domain whose
instruction is launched in fields of promoted action.
Attentional anchors lie at the intermediate level of interaction between sub-
ject and environment. Similar to affordances, their nature is relational, hybrid.
Numerous studies in skill acquisition of sport techniques suggest the comparative
advantage of directing learners’ focus away from internal kinesiological com-
ponents toward external environmental structures (Wulf & Su, 2007; Zarghami,
Saemi, & Fathi, 2012). For example, when swimmers practice the arm stroke in
crawl style, they perform better by focusing on pushing the water back than on
pulling their hands back (Stoate & Wulf, 2011).
Attentional anchors may be a specific object (real or imagined), area, or other
aspect, behavior, or characterization of the perceptual manifold that an agent
detects, invokes, selects, and uses to monitor perception–action couplings for the
activity at hand. Attentional anchors include the location, sensation, and effect of
the subject’s orientation during motor-action performance. The attentional anchor
emerges and interpolates itself into the agent–environment relation to serve as
an enabling environmental constraint—it becomes a new systemic element that
hones and channels attention for action. The attentional anchor reduces opera-
tional complexity, rendering ergonomic and feasible an otherwise overwhelming
task (Kelso & Engstrøm, 2006; Newell & Ranganathan, 2010). The agent acts on
the attentional anchor as its control panel and dashboard, which the agent expe-
riences as overlaid on the perceptual field—the attentional anchor becomes the
mediating proxy for both operating on the environment and interpreting feed-
back from the environment. Specifically, the attentional anchor enables learners
to operate on the environment via managing complex information invariants.
Attentional anchors can be immaterial. In general, constraints can be embodied
in concrete objects, such as a line of plastic cones across a soccer field that artic-
ulate a slalom dribbling path. But constraints can be immaterial, invisible, and
even imaginary, so that students themselves must install the constraints into their
field of promoted action. For example, a juggling coach may instruct the novice
to imagine a tall rectangle rooted in her hands and soaring above her head. This
invisible geometric shape becomes an attentional anchor—a phenomenologically
real percept that mediates the juggler’s control of the balls (see Liao & Masters,
2001, on biomechanical metaphors, which are imagined geometric shapes that
athletes are instructed to project into the perceptuomotor space).
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ECOLOGICAL DYNAMICS 219
Attentional anchors and motor-action skill emerge dialectically, iteratively:
Even as attentional anchors materialize between agent and environment as medi-
ating control structures, they in turn afford the development of those very
motor-action coordinations that would be necessary for operating on the environ-
ment via these control structures. In terms of the theory of instrumental genesis
(Verillon & Rabardel, 1995), attentional anchors are Artifacts that the Subject
projects between herself and her Objective.
Attentional anchors might be discovered by individuals, as in the anecdotal
case of the cellist, above, or suggested by instructors in the form of augmented
information, such as if another string player reading this text now attempts to
implement this attentional anchor. It is important to note that although individuals
may cultivate their own attentional anchors discreetly, under the radar of con-
sciousness, we submit that attentional anchors can be reified via reflection and
discourse. Our empirical examples argue this point.
Summary
We have now outlined the theory of ecological dynamics as well as its concomitant
nonlinear pedagogy and constraints-led model. The theory of ecological dynamics
draws from a tradition of examining natural and social phenomena from a com-
plexity perspective (Edelman, 1987) and specifically implicating motor-action
roots of cognitive development (Savelsbergh, Vereijken, & Zaal, 2005). The appli-
cation of system dynamics theory to the modeling of educational settings and
activities has precedents in the literature of the learning sciences (Barab et al.,
1999; Clancey, 2008; Davis & Sumara, 2008; Greeno, 1998). Furthermore, the rel-
evance of sports sciences to the theory of embodied cognition has previously been
proposed (Beilock, 2008). Yet we view ecological dynamics as serving particu-
larly well our attempts to implicate motor action as bringing forth mathematical
ideas and to witness this fragile, spontaneous process in the microevents of stu-
dents’ guided, goal-oriented interactions with manipulable features of learning
environments.
More specifically, ecological dynamics, along with the hypothetical construct
of attentional anchors, may enable us to explain three types of intriguing phe-
nomena that we have observed repeatedly in our empirical data yet appear to
defy existing theoretical frameworks: (a) the spontaneous emergence of new onto-
logical entities into the dynamics of student–environment relations, along with
these new entities’ affordances for action; (b) students’ adoption of environmental
features, such as mathematical frames of reference, as tools for enhancing phys-
ical interaction, discourse, and reflection; and (c) the interaction mechanics of
teachers’ intervention tactics for steering students toward effective engagement
of burgeoning mathematical structures. These three phenomena are treated in the
next section by further considering empirical data collected during experimental
implementation of the MIT-P.
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THE ECOLOGICAL DYNAMICS OF THE MIT: PARADIGMATIC
EXAMPLES FROM IMPLEMENTING AN ACTION-BASED,
CONCEPT-ORIENTED LEARNING ACTIVITY
New educational technology may give rise to new forms of teaching and learning
not readily explicable by existing theory. Looking at embodied-interaction tech-
nology, here we present a set of vignettes paradigmatic of our three research
problems: (a) the spontaneous emergence of higher order structures facilitating
sensorimotor activity, (b) sensorimotor assimilation of symbolic artifacts en route
to mathematical discourse, and (c) forms of tutorial intervention unique to math-
ematical fields of promoted action. Our empirical data are drawn from a study
that implemented the MIT-P with 22 Grade 4–6 students who participated either
individually or in pairs in task-based semistructured clinical interviews (Howison
et al., 2011). The vignettes were selected both to feature a variety of students
differing in age and mathematical achievement and to provide snapshots of three
different stages along the activity design.
In all cases, the researcher and student worked in a quiet room on the school
campus. They sat side by side so that the researcher could see at once both the
student’s manual actions and the effects of these actions on the computer moni-
tor. For continuity across the vignettes, we focus on student behavior around the
numerical item of a 1:2 ratio, that is, where the technological interaction system
is set up so that the screen will turn green only if the ratio between the respective
heights of the left and right hands is at 1:2 above the bottom edge of the monitor.
The Emergence of an Attentional Anchor Mediating Agent–Environment
Dynamics
The MIT-P system potentiates multiple embodied entries into the mathematical
field of proportionality, such as difference, speed, rate, and multiplicative relations
(for an exhaustive list of students’ green-making strategies, see Abrahamson
et al., 2014; Reinholz et al., 2010). By embodied entries we are referring to the
emergence of motor-action control structures leading to mathematical significa-
tion, where this emergence is heavily designed for yet locally spontaneous—it
is unmodeled, undirected, and uncued by the tutor. As a case in point, we now
treat dynamical control strategies oriented on the spatial interval between the two
hands.
Irit is a Grade 5 female student assessed by her teacher as a “high achiever.”
During the first 4 min of the MIT-P activity, Dor (the researcher–tutor) explains to
Irit the task objective and resources. Initially the screen is red, and the two remote-
control devices lie on the desk. Irit lifts the controls. In an attempt to make the
screen green, she waves them up and down in several different patterns. Fourteen
seconds later, she strikes green and freezes her hands. Irit has placed the cursors
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ECOLOGICAL DYNAMICS 221
FIGURE 4 Irit (child on right) is working with the Mathematical Imagery Trainer for
Proportion, with Dor (researcher–tutor) looking on. The ratio is set at 1:2. The cursors are
at about a quarter (left) and half (right) way up the screen, and so the screen is green.
at about a quarter way up the screen (left hand) and halfway up (right hand), that
is, at a 1:2 ratio, and so the screen has turned green. The following conversation
ensues (see Figure 4). (Verbal utterances appear in bold for legibility.)
Irit: They have to be a certain distance.
Dor: They have to be a certain distance.
Irit: (She lowers her right hand to about quarter height, which is the same
height as the left hand, and so the screen becomes red. She then lifts
her right hand back to the previous location, and the screen becomes
green again.) They can’t be together.
Dor: They can’t be together, you’re saying.
Irit: (30 s of silent exploration) But this one (right) has to be higher.
Dor: So they have to be a certain distance, and right has to be higher.
As she engages in solving the embodied-interaction problem, Irit so far has
made two observations about what she believes are effective strategies for achiev-
ing the task objective of making the screen green. The first observation highlights
the distance between the two cursors as a property of the visual display correlated
with the desired effect of green. Specifically, the observation “They have to be a
certain distance” suggests some absolute magnitude for this interval. At the same
time, the observation suggests that Irit believes that this certain distance is not
tied to a particular screen location but could be implemented in other locations.
After some experimentation, Irit further determines a second observation: “This
one [right] has to be higher.”
Dor then augments on the direct feedback that Irit received from the interaction:
He suggests that she explore higher and lower regions of the screen. Raising both
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222 ABRAHAMSON AND SÁNCHEZ-GARCÍA
hands higher, Irit keeps her certain distance constant (a fixed distance between her
hands), and so the screen turns red. Eventually the following exchange ensues:
Dor: So what happens to the distance?
Irit: Oh! No, it gets shorter if you go down more, and then it gets
tall . . . longer if you go up. . . . It has to be . . . [the] higher this
one (right hand) goes, the lower this one (left hand) has to go.
The distance gets bigger up higher, and smaller down here.
The interval between Irit’s hands has thus become entified out of negative
space. It articulated into being, foregrounded as an auxiliary stimulus wedged
between agent and task. It emerged through goal-oriented explorative interaction
as a thing—a handle, a lever, a utensil crafted ad hoc out of thin air; an entity that
was objectified, described, and referenced; a thing whose own features were modi-
fied along select dimensions, and these modifications in turn were coordinated and
correlated. The interval thus evolved into a ready-to-hand tool mediating situated
implementation of motor intentionality.
The interval emerged for Irit because doing so favorably collapsed two motor-
action schemes into a single scheme—from moving two hands to manipulating
one thing. This simpler scheme is thus oriented on a physically extraneous focus-
ing medium, the interval. Indeed, as they manipulated the interval, our study
participants never spoke about what each individual hand should do but rather
about the behavior, handling, and impact of the interval. The interval, an exter-
nal object, served the students as an attentional anchor that promoted their
performance.
In this section we treated the first research problem: spontaneous microgenesis
of imaginary objects mediating sensorimotor control of interactive systems. As we
see in the next section, once symbolic artifacts are interpolated into the working
space as potential frames of reference, the interval—and in particular its contoured
grasp—creates new opportunities for mathematical signification.
Sensorimotor Assimilation of Symbolic Artifacts en Route to Mathematical
Discourse
When the interviewer was ready to light up the grid on the computer monitor,
he would prepare the child for the introduction of this new element in the visual
display by stating, “Now, I’m about to add something here—let’s see what this
does for us.” In Reinholz et al. (2010), we described the new behaviors we wit-
nessed once the grid was introduced onto the display, such as the a-per-b strategy,
in which the students might state, “For every 1 unit that I go up on the left, I go up
2 on the right.” We noted the pedagogical value of these changes in strategy—the
activity was apparently steering the students from situated qualitative description
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ECOLOGICAL DYNAMICS 223
to general quantitative redescription (Abrahamson et al., 2011). Here we examine
students’ microbehaviors as the attentional anchor frames initial perceptions and
uptake of the grid.
Eden and Uri are sixth-grade male students identified by their mathematics
teacher as “high achieving.” They worked as a pair on the MIT-P problem, so that
the control of the two cursors was distributed between them: Eden sat on the left
and controlled the left-hand cursor, and Uri sat on the right and controlled the
right-hand cursor. Sitting side by side, both students faced the screen. We join the
dyad about 20 min into the interview. They had been working on the continuous
screen (no grid), and now the interviewer was about to switch on the grid.
Below we use the following abbreviations: RT = right-hand tracker (the
remote-control device), LT = left-hand tracker, Rc = right-hand cursor (that is
operated by RT), and Lc = left-hand cursor. Also, particular gridlines are indexed
as in graphs by their order relative to the base line (e.g., “3-line” is the third
gridline up from the datum line). The symbol // indicates simultaneous talk.
Eden: (The grid is switched on) Grid.
Uri: Yeah. (Grabs RT, lifts Rc up to 1-line. Simultaneously, Eden, too,
lifts Lc up to 1-line. On the way up, between 0-line and 1-line, the
screen flashes green for a moment but then turns red. Eden lowers
Lc back down, holds it at .5 units. The screen turns green.) Oh so
you can like show where . . . Let’s see, so (Rc up from 1-line to
2-line) // if you’re on here . . .
Eden: // maybe it has to be two . . . (Lc up to 1-line; see Figure 5a) an
entire box apart.
Uri: (Rc up to 3-line) If I go here . . .
Eden: (Lc up to 2-line; screen goes red; see Figure 5b) Then maybe you
should raise it (Uri raises Rc to just below 4-line; screen flashes
green). So maybe the higher you go, the more boxes it is apart.
Soon after, the dyad shifted from their higher–bigger strategy, which is continuous
and qualitative, to an a-per-b strategy, which is discrete and quantitative.
What is intriguing to us in this short excerpt is a nonevent—the students’ casual
projection of the interval onto the gridlines. The grid is a constraint introduced
into the student–screen relation, but it readily affords the existing motor-action
coordination. When Eden says, “Maybe it has to be two . . . an entire box apart,”
the pronoun it refers to the interval between the cursors. The gridlines offloaded
and materialized the attentional anchor by offering distal proxies for its lower and
upper bounds. The attentional anchor was thus reified in the public domain in the
form of a perceptually stable, externally present, deictically referable, bounded
entity. This shift was smooth. Yet once the interval operation had been delegated
to the grid lines, an abrupt shift occurred that culminated with the new a-per-b
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ECOLOGICAL DYNAMICS 225
scheme. This scheme achieved stability, because it enhanced the coproduction of
green by regulating the dyadic turn-taking coordination of motor actions.
Phase shifts in motor-action coordination might be smooth or abrupt, depend-
ing on whether the existing routines can be maintained with the introduction of
new task/environmental constraints (Kelso, 1984; Kostrubiec, Zanone, Fuchs, &
Kelso, 2012). Following the introduction of the grid we witness first a smooth and
then an abrupt shift.
We are excited by this new theoretical insight into how action grips symbol,
because we perceive ecological dynamics as minding the epistemic gap between
action and symbol. That is, the theory offers an explanation for how situated phys-
ical actions give rise to disciplinary content: Students engage symbolic artifacts as
reified attentional anchors that first mediate action yet then shift activity discourse
into semiotic registers. Ecological dynamics thus views conceptual development
as the spontaneous, situated adoption of symbolic artifacts as action tools.
Symbolic artifacts bear hybrid ontology, in the sense that they are both perceptual
and semiotic entities (Uttal, Scudder, & DeLoache, 1997). They are “transitional
objects” (Papert, 1980, p. 161)—both sensory and abstract. We might grab a sym-
bol for its perceptuomotor affordance for action yet only subsequently leverage its
semiotic potential for planning and communicating prospective actions, elaborat-
ing reasoning, and supporting argumentation. We “language” attentional anchors,
articulating them via available frames of reference into the grammar of explicit
reflection, and in so doing we reinvent and internalize cultural meanings. Thus, the
meaning of a mathematical symbol is established as the felt sense of its afforded
action (Cisek, 1999, p. 136).
We have now treated our second research problem: adoption of symbolic
artifacts as regulatory enactive, epistemic, and discursive devices. In the final
subsection we zoom out to foreground the instructor’s active role in monitoring
the field of promoted action.
The Instructor’s Multimodal Intervention as Environmental Constraints on
Action
If learning is the education of perceptuomotor attention (Gibson, 1966), then
teachers can play pivotal roles in this process. Indeed, the MIT-P tutors developed
a variety of instructional techniques to assist study participants in solving the
motor-action coordination problem (Abrahamson et al., 2012). Here we describe
and exemplify techniques consisting particularly of expert–novice physical
coenactment.
One coenactment method is to distribute the operation of the control devices,
one person per device. Figure 6a shows a tutor structuring a student’s search in the
physical problem space. The tutor fixates the location of the left-side virtual object
on the computer monitor, waits for the student to determine the corresponding
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FIGURE 6 Hands-on mathematics instruction. (a) Comanipulating virtual objects via
distributed coenactment. (b) Molding via joint coenactment.
right-side location that affects the target state (green screen), then iterates the pro-
cedure until the student assumes agency in leading the activity. Another method is
to co-operate both control devices—that is, with both people each handling both
devices. Figure 6b shows a tutor coaching a student to move in a new way. As the
student raises her arms, the tutor gently constrains the motions by either speeding
up or slowing down each of the hands so as to achieve the target state, all the
while responsively enabling the student gradually to assume agency in enacting
the coordinated actions.
Shani (see Figure 6) is a fifth-grade female student indicated by her mathemat-
ics teacher as “low performing.” The vignette begins at a moment when Shani is
holding the cursors up at about 1.5 (Lc) and 3 (Rc), and so the screen is green.
After some lull, in which Shani appears unsure how to proceed, Dor positions
himself to the left of Shani, and the following interaction ensues:
Dor: I have an idea. I’ll take charge of this one, alright? (takes
LT, with Shani still handling RT) And I’ll put it . . . I dunno
. . . here. (places Lc at 3-line; screen goes red; Shani is still
holding Rc at 3-line) Can you make the screen green when
he’s here? (Shani lifts Rc up to near 6-line, adjusting for darker
green at 6-line, and holds it there. The dyad holds their positions
for about 16 s.) Okay, how about when I go here (Dor lifts Lc
to 4-line, the screen goes red, and Shani promptly lifts to near
8-line, adjusting for darker green at 8-line; see Figure 6a. The
dyad keeps holding the cursors at those precise locations.)
Shani: Wait a minute. A while ago you asked me how many greens
there are. It . . . could really be infinite.
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ECOLOGICAL DYNAMICS 227
Dor: Oh.
Shani: Like, because, if it really is all about the distance between
them (gestures diagonal line between cursors), which is, like
. . . I think it is, because it’s getting darker, depending on
that . . . uhhm . . . , then it really doesn’t matter where on
the screen it is.
Shani realizes that there is an infinite number of green positions on the screen.
Dor: Okay. And what else do we know about the distance? Like if I
came here (lifts Lc to 5-line, which is halfway up the screen, and
screen goes red), what would you want to do?
Shani: I’d go up (lifts Rc to 10, which is the highest gridline on the
screen; the screen goes green), and then it would become green
again.
Dor: Aha, okay. And if I’m down, let’s looks what happens say if
I’m all the way down here. (Lowers Lc to 1-line; screen goes
red)
Shani: (lowers Rc to 2-line; screen goes green) It looks like 2. Yeah.
Dor: 1 and 2. (Dyad continues holding the cursors at 1 and 2)
Shani: So basically, like, uhhmm (points to screen), if you put either
one on a point, you’d be able to find a green.
Dor: Ha! What if this one is at 2? (raises Lc to 2, screen goes red)
Where do you think that one should be?
Shani: (Raises Rc to 4-line; screen goes green) Oh they’re getting far-
ther apart as it goes up (gestures an interval between right-hand
thumb and middle finger, which she points toward the screen)
Dor: (Dragan, a confidante, looks at Dor, who raises eyebrows dis-
creetly.) Oh.
This is the first time Shani assumes agency in leading the joint activity Dor has
initiated.
Shani: Like, the last . . . (points downward on screen to previous posi-
tions; Dor responds by lowering Lc to 1-line, Shani lowers Rc to
2-line) Like, yeah, here it was, like, 1 and 2, but (raises Rc to 4-
line; simultaneously, in continuous green, Dor raises Lc for green
at 2-line) then it was 2 and 4.
Dor: Huh. What do you think it will be if I bring it up to 3? (Lc to
3-line, red)
Shani: Probably 6. (Rc-to 6-line, green)
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228 ABRAHAMSON AND SÁNCHEZ-GARCÍA
Dor: Huh. . . . How . . . Why did, why did you get 6? Yeah, you’re
right!
Shani: Well it’s going up . . . by a box. (gestures box interval toward
screen)
Shani is referring to the vertical interval between the cursors that increased by
1 grid unit between 1-and-2, 2-and-4, 3-and-6, and so on.
Dor: Oh, I see. (Raises Lc to 4-line, red)
Shani: So now this would be 8 probably (Rc to 8-line, green).
Dor: Yeah . . . What’s going up by a box? I kind of get what you
mean, but not completely. What is going up by a box?
Shani: Well the x . . . (points to cursor, which is shaped as a+) Well the
bottom one (Lc) is going up by 1 box, but the top one (Rc) is
going up by 2.
Dor: Ohhhh . . . okay.
In the course of speaking about the interval between the cursors, which is
increasing by one box each move (the higher–bigger principle), Shani finds herself
shifting to the relative elevation of each of the two cursors (the a-per-b principle).
Soon after, Shani notes that the different displacements of each cursor (the a and
b) account for the changing interval between the cursors.
Dor hands Lc over to Shani. She performs a perfect continuous green while
raising both cursors, followed by a near-perfect green lowering of the cursors. The
performance appears to enact a-per-b simultaneously rather than sequentially.
Dor then asks Shani what else she has noticed about the numbers, and Shani
immediately detects and validates that Rc is always double Lc, and she attributes
this new relationship to the fact that Lc goes up by 1 for every 2 that Rc goes
up. She says that now she can predict, given a left-hand location, where the right
hand should be.
In a matter of several minutes, Shani has thus both detected and connected
four insights: (a) There are infinite green locations on the screen, (b) the size and
elevation of the interval between the cursors should correlate for green, (c) the
cursors rise at different yet coordinated rates, and (d) the cursors’ green locations
are related by a consistent multiplicative factor of 2. The distributed coenactment
appears to have been important for Shani to generate this rapid succession of
interconnected insights.
Dragan then removes the grid and numerals from the screen, leaving only the
cursors, and asks Shani to try to perform green while moving her hands up and
then down again. Shani places her hands at about where the 4-line and 8-line had
been. She then moves up to the invisible 5-line and 10-line. After an imperfect
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 C
ali
fo
rn
ia,
 B
erk
ele
y]
 at
 00
:54
 15
 Ju
ne
 20
16
 
ECOLOGICAL DYNAMICS 229
green run up and down the screen, Shani comments that it is more difficult to do
without the grid.
Immediately then we arrive at the case of joint coenactment (Figure 6b).
Dor: (Positions himself behind Shani’s seat) Why don’t you hold
them for a moment (Shani grabs the remotes, and Dor gently
holds Shani’s left hand in his left hand, and her right hand in his
right) I want to see if I can track your hands all the way up
in green. I’m going to find a green place . . . (places cursors at
about the invisible locations of 1-line and 2-line and, once stable
at dark green, begins lifting both hands slowly, in green).
Shani: So this one should be m . . . so my right should be moving
faster . . .,
Dor: Oh, I see.
Shani: . . . so then it can be going up 2 spaces on the grid . . . on the
graph, while the other one’s only going 1.
Dor: Oh, I see. (They continue to raise their hands, get to the top, then
come down again, all in perfect green.) Cool.
Shani thus discovered yet another visualization of the effective motor action:
The right hand must move faster than the left hand. Moreover, she coordinated
between speed and rate—or, if you will, between “smooth and chunky images
of change” (Castillo-Garsow, Johnson, & Moore, 2013)—by accounting for the
hands’ correlative continuous speeds in terms of the hands’ coiterated respective
composite units (1 and 2).
We have thus presented a case of a tutor who molded a child’s embodied prac-
tice. As in the previous case of distributed coenactment, the child’s agency in joint
coenactment trends from relative passivity toward leading the joint production:
Once a general sense of pace is coestablished, the child falls in with the actions, so
that eventually the tutor may remove his hands. In this particular episode, mold-
ing the child’s manipulation—a direct physical constraint—enabled her for the
first time to attend to the hands’ relative speeds. She also linked speed and rate by
revisualizing this speed-based performance as a simultaneous enactment of a-per-
b strategy—for every 1 unit that the left hand rose, the right hand rose 2 units at
the same time (Abrahamson et al., 2014).
In this section we encountered two ways in which a teacher might introduce
supplemental constraints on the novice’s sensorimotor activity in the field of pro-
moted action. These ways involved coenacting a cultural practice with a novice
either by distribution of the task as a coordinated coproduction or by joint oper-
ation. Both ways were oriented on systemically steering the student to detect
new attentional anchors empirically. That is, the student is to discern systemic
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230 ABRAHAMSON AND SÁNCHEZ-GARCÍA
information structures bearing dynamical invariance and manipulate these struc-
tures directly as new mediating objects. The choreography of coenactment shifts
from sequential turn taking to simultaneous coperforming, in which both agents
are constantly and dynamically interdependent on each other’s mutually respon-
sive coordination (Masciotra, Ackermann, & Roth, 2001). As in the internal
martial arts practice of push-hands, the two participants in this joint coproduc-
tion of the green screen continuously yet silently negotiate leadership. Similar to
a pair of athletes in a two-person sport, such as rowing or luge, tutor and student
reach an intimate level of intersubjective sensorimotor coordination by anticipat-
ing and closely tracking each other’s actions (Bekkering et al., 2009; Gallese &
Lakoff, 2005). The tutor might then hand over the tracker and let the student enact
the new strategy solo.
We have now treated our last research problem: educators’ active role in
facilitating effective sensorimotor engagement.
CONCLUSION
We have introduced the theory of ecological dynamics, which originates in
kinesiology and sports science. We argued for the purchase of this theory
in mathematics-education research. In particular, we argued that ecological
dynamics offers an analytic lens geared to filling the enduring theoretical gap in
tracking and explaining students’ ontogenesis from goal-oriented sensorimotor
action to conceptual reasoning. Our argument was contextualized in artifacts
and findings from a design-based research project that has been developing
and evaluating a pedagogical activity involving the solution of motor-action
coordination problems. A set of vignettes from an empirical study detailed and
elaborated the argument.
These are still early days in the application of motor-action theories to
mathematics education research, and many questions remain. Nevertheless, we
cautiously submit that the theory of ecological dynamics offers a useful frame-
work for designing, implementing, and analyzing activities in which students
develop fundamental understandings of mathematical notions via solving and
reflecting on motor-action inquiry problems. From this view, mathematical mean-
ings emerge from the guided signification of situated motor-action coordinations
(for parallel perspectives on action coordinations in language development, see
Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002). The theory thus supports an integration of seminal
constructivist and sociocultural perspectives on human learning.
Students can develop mathematical coordinations via engaging in carefully
designed activities. Given appropriate cultural mediation, students can fairly
instantaneously learn to move and therefore think in new ways that then become
elaborated, refined, and reformulated as disciplinary discourse. This thesis sug-
gests children’s universal capacity to deeply understand mathematical concepts,
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ECOLOGICAL DYNAMICS 231
regardless of prior academic accomplishment, because it shifts the site of critical
mathematical learning away from the symbolic semiotic register toward situated
sensorimotor engagement with manipulation problems.
Per the ecological dynamics view of mathematics education, latent stimuli in
the field of promoted action—features, patterns, and even imaginary features,
clusters of features, and mixed actual and imagined features—become salient and
meaningful through their apparent capacity to enable the satisfaction of task objec-
tives. These stimuli are thus temporarily foregrounded as objects (gestalts) that
the agent evaluates as potentially instrumental in mediating the achievement of
task objectives. These objects are psychological constructions of available features
of the environment (objectifications; Radford, 2000)—the objects suggest them-
selves as attentional anchors enhancing motor-action performance. For example,
an empty space between two hands can emerge into consciousness in the course
of embodied interaction, spontaneously coalescing from negative space into situ-
ated pertinence. Thus, nothing becomes thing, an interval whose size is controlled,
monitored, measured, and correlated with contextual goals. The attentional anchor
is therefore a self-generated auxiliary stimulus that pops up between agent and
environment. Attentional anchors are ad hoc groundings of evolving operatory
schemes, contrived handles extending motor intentionality to better grip the world.
We adopt and exercise attentional anchors because they prove useful in getting a
job done. An attentional anchor is an invented constellation of selected features
in the perceptual field. It is utilized as an instrument for controlling a situation.
In turn, attentional anchors serve as presymbolic kernels of new concepts as the
activity shifts into disciplinary frames of reference.
Ecological dynamics brings back motor action into learning (Savelsbergh et al.,
2005). And if learning mathematics begins from learning to move in a new way,
then learning mathematics could be not too unlike learning to become a dental
hygienist (Becvar Weddle & Hollan, 2010), musical instrumentalist (Haviland,
2011; Simones, Rodger, & Schroeder, 2014), potter (Churchill, 2016), knitter
(Lindwall & Ekström, 2012), carpenter (Ingold, 2000), dancer (Katz, 2013), or
martial artist (Sánchez-García, 2013). In all of these spatial–dynamical manual
practices, novices must develop habits not only of professional perception per se
(Arcavi, 2003; Goodwin, 1994; Stevens & Hall, 1998) but of perceptuomotor ori-
entation to their respective domains (and see Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2005, p. 59,
on visual perception as grasping). In the case of complex production tasks, a
perceptuomotor orientation evolves dialectically with the emergence of attentional
anchors that mediate a tighter grip on the world by affording ergonomic motor-
action coordination (Hutto & Sánchez-García, 2015). Discursive treatment of
attentional anchors then organizes the social enactment of cultural practice. Inter
alia, discourse increases the specificity of novices’ evolving actions and contex-
tualizes these actions in frames of reference from the greater activity structure.
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232 ABRAHAMSON AND SÁNCHEZ-GARCÍA
Thus, shared meanings of disciplinary concepts are consolidated (Goodwin, 1994;
Hutchins, 1995; Radford, 2010; Trninic & Abrahamson, 2013).
Educators play pivotal roles in creating and managing students’ discovery,
manipulation, and transition to new artifacts. Instructors scaffold student activity
by implementing task or environmental constraints that bound the agent’s search
for effective motor-action coordinations. Even when the instructor tightly molds
students’ engagement in embodied interaction, it is ultimately the students who
must discover for themselves both the specifying information structures and their
motor-action affordances. Later in the learning activity, the instructor introduces
additional constraints in the form of figural artifacts bearing semiotic potential—
the agent hooks these artifacts for their pragmatic or epistemic utility, yet in so
doing shifts into mathematical register.
Embodied-interaction learning environments transform the practice of math-
ematical teaching, rendering it similar to coaching in the overtly physical
disciplines, such as music, dance, or carpentry. Yet for these new pedagogical
methodologies to enter educational institutions, we would have to rethink multiple
aspects of mathematics teachers’ professional practice, beginning from epistemol-
ogy and through to assessment. Embodied interaction might help remediate what
Thompson (2013) diagnosed as “the absence of meaning” in mathematics educa-
tion. To the extent that meanings emerge from presymbolic multimodal operatory
schemes afforded by actual or imagined perceptual features, ecological dynamics
stands to stimulate this concerted discussion (Hutto, Kirchhoff, & Abrahamson,
2015).
Embodied-interaction activities offer solutions for researchers and teachers
alike who wish to both observe mathematical thinking as it is occurring and
offer students opportunities to reflect on their actions. Thus, embodied-interaction
activities take us one step closer in responding to a lament expressed by Von
Glasersfeld (1983):
[A] useful analogy [for the teaching of mathematics content] might be found in the
teaching of athletic skills. . . . Unfortunately, we have no tachistoscope or camera
that could capture the dynamics, the detailed progression of steps, of the mental
operations that lead to the solution of a numerical problem. (pp. 51–52)
Von Glasersfeld (1983) concluded that the only way to become apprised of
children’s mathematical thinking is to conduct teaching experiments, Steffe’s
combination of pedagogical design with Piagetian task-based semistructured
clinical interviews.
Von Glasersfeld might have been heartened to learn that eye-tracking technol-
ogy can indeed “capture the dynamics, the detailed progression of steps, of the
mental operations that lead to the solution of a numerical problem.” As we track
the gaze of children attempting to make the screen green, we can literally see the
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ECOLOGICAL DYNAMICS 233
emergence of attentional anchors as perceptual attractors prior to their verbal or
gestural articulation as mathematical objects (Abrahamson et al., in press; Shayan,
Abrahamson, Bakker, Duijzer, & Van der Schaaf, 2015).
As the theory and practice of embodied interaction develop, an important
avenue of research is to determine the conceptual scope of these technological
designs beyond simple functions in the Cartesian plane (Nemirovsky, Kelton, &
Rhodehamel, 2013). For example, what would embodied interaction look like for
algebra or calculus? As we ourselves pursue these questions, we hope to have
stirred some interest in the endeavor.
This line of work—developing, analyzing, and evaluating mathematics learn-
ing from an ecological dynamics perspective—seems urgent to us. Even as
children are increasingly engaging both in and out of school in embodied interac-
tion within technological environments, such as manipulating touchscreen tablets,
their coordinated motor actions are scarcely considered in terms of the conceptual
development they might foster. And yet embodied interaction is precisely where
conceptual development begins. As we consider future directions for theories of
learning as well as the opportunities for learning that will coemerge with these
theories, we believe that in more than one sense learning is moving in new ways.
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